Perhaps the time has come for Israel to stop thinking in terms of "terrorists" and "terror acts" when relating to organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas which seek to destroy it.Simpler to term such organizations as the "enemy".
The terminology of terrorism has lead to a double standard which only has adverse effects on those trying to counter terrorism. The terrorist can attack civilians directly without having to justify his behavior - he is a terrorist and kills civilians in order to pursue his objectives. On the other hand, the country countering terror is not permitted to directly target civilians in order to pursue his objectives. Israel has killed civilians in Lebanon but only indirectly whilst trying to target Hezbollah rocket launchers. The Hezbollah targets Israeli civilians directly.Therefore the Hezbollah has a distinct advantage over Israel. From its point of view if it were only to target the Israeli military it would achieve far less than it has by directly targetting civilians.
Why not even the moral playing field and term both sides as mutual enemies where all is fair in love and war? Were Israel to directly target civilians as did Britain when it destroyed Dresden in World War Two, it might actually succeed in convincing civilians that shelter the Hezbollah that it is very much not in their interests to do so.
Once this become clear to people anywhere that permit such organizations to act from within population centres that their lives are going to be deliberately targeted, then they may finally understand that these organizations actions are self-detrimental in the extreme.
By freeing itself of the need to term someone or some organization as being terrorist, Israel will no longer have to fight with one hand tied behind its back.Finally it would absolve all of us from becoming embroiled in the futile "who is a terrorist debate".Futile, because Israel's primary goal is its survival and that of its people and no amount of moral superiority can prevent the deliberate (as opposed to incidental) deaths of innocent people murdered by Hezbollah rockets.
Tuesday, July 25, 2006
Wednesday, July 19, 2006
POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE HIZBULLAH ATTACK ON ISRAEL
The flagrant breach of Israeli sovereignty by the Hizbullah in kidnapping two Israeli soldiers has led to what is fast turning into a mini-war on Israel's northern border. Whilst the dust is far from settling it is worth pondering three major political implications resulting from the fact that Hizbullah has succeeded in launching over1,500 rocket attacks on Israel's northern heartland.
1.Israel's total withdrawal from Lebanon over five years ago led to the relatively large scale arming of the Hizbullah (by Syria and Iran) to such an extent that it has succeeded in launching serious rocket attacks on Israel - certainly more serious than the thirty nine Scud missiles that Saddam Hussein's Iraq fired at Israel in 1991. Israel's enemies will certainly take note of how a small terrorist organization has succeeded putting Israel's northern home front on alert. The question posed is whether these enemies will be tempted into taking on Israel on a far larger scale than the Hizbulla has done or is able to? Israel has not responded to the Hizballah attacks by way of launching all out war on Lebanese soil but rather with a limited campaign. Were it to be attacked by enemies that are nation sates such as Iran and Syria it would obviously react with all or most of the power at its disposal and this should deter a rational enemy from trying to do what the Hizbullah has done so far - an attack on Israel's heartlands by an enemy state would result in total war causing death and destruction on such a colossal scale that it is doubtful whether such countries would want to try their hand against Israel as the Hizbullah has.
2. The events in Lebanon and Gaza have occurred in territory which Israel has unilaterally withdrawn from. The resulting unprecedented attacks on Israel's home front has cast serious doubts on the wisdom of future withdrawals (either bi-lateral or unilaterally) from land held by Israel in Judea and Samaria. Israel will be hardpressed to give up land when it is now very plausible that the Palestinians will in future launch attacks on central Israel as they have done on the South from Gaza and as has Hizbullah has done in the North from Lebanon. Moreover,the western world is far more liklelier to understand the terrible security dilemma that Israel will face should it withdraw from Judea and Samaria.In a very real sense Hizbullah has by its actions severely damaged the Palestinian cause. Israel may well have to look for another option with regard to solving the Judea and Samaria predicament (and Gaza) such as striving for a settlement with the Jordanians and Egyptians leading them to control land given up by Israel in trust for some sort of completely disarmed Palestinian entity.
3. If the Kadima's government planned redrawing of Israel's borders (even unilaterally) goes awry as a result of the second Lebanese war then the ideological differences betweenKadima and the Likud parties will be reduced paving the way for a unification between Kadima and the Likud. Israel would then revert to a traditional two (as opposed to three) major party system.
1.Israel's total withdrawal from Lebanon over five years ago led to the relatively large scale arming of the Hizbullah (by Syria and Iran) to such an extent that it has succeeded in launching serious rocket attacks on Israel - certainly more serious than the thirty nine Scud missiles that Saddam Hussein's Iraq fired at Israel in 1991. Israel's enemies will certainly take note of how a small terrorist organization has succeeded putting Israel's northern home front on alert. The question posed is whether these enemies will be tempted into taking on Israel on a far larger scale than the Hizbulla has done or is able to? Israel has not responded to the Hizballah attacks by way of launching all out war on Lebanese soil but rather with a limited campaign. Were it to be attacked by enemies that are nation sates such as Iran and Syria it would obviously react with all or most of the power at its disposal and this should deter a rational enemy from trying to do what the Hizbullah has done so far - an attack on Israel's heartlands by an enemy state would result in total war causing death and destruction on such a colossal scale that it is doubtful whether such countries would want to try their hand against Israel as the Hizbullah has.
2. The events in Lebanon and Gaza have occurred in territory which Israel has unilaterally withdrawn from. The resulting unprecedented attacks on Israel's home front has cast serious doubts on the wisdom of future withdrawals (either bi-lateral or unilaterally) from land held by Israel in Judea and Samaria. Israel will be hardpressed to give up land when it is now very plausible that the Palestinians will in future launch attacks on central Israel as they have done on the South from Gaza and as has Hizbullah has done in the North from Lebanon. Moreover,the western world is far more liklelier to understand the terrible security dilemma that Israel will face should it withdraw from Judea and Samaria.In a very real sense Hizbullah has by its actions severely damaged the Palestinian cause. Israel may well have to look for another option with regard to solving the Judea and Samaria predicament (and Gaza) such as striving for a settlement with the Jordanians and Egyptians leading them to control land given up by Israel in trust for some sort of completely disarmed Palestinian entity.
3. If the Kadima's government planned redrawing of Israel's borders (even unilaterally) goes awry as a result of the second Lebanese war then the ideological differences betweenKadima and the Likud parties will be reduced paving the way for a unification between Kadima and the Likud. Israel would then revert to a traditional two (as opposed to three) major party system.
Tuesday, July 11, 2006
A POSSIBLE WAY OUT OF THE SHALIT HOSTAGE SITUATION
Both Israel and the Hamas government are at an impasse over the Gilad Shalit hostage situation. Both sides are in a sense hostages to their own public opinion. Israel refuses to release Palestinian detainees held in its prisons in return for Shalit's release. The release of detainees will in Israeli opinion be perceived as a surrender to terrorist demands. The Hamas for its part cannot because of Palestinian public opinion release the captured soldier without attaining the release of Palestinian detainees. The ideal solution would be a win-win one where neither side is perceived to be giving up on principle but at the same time would achieve the desired result for both parties. This can be achieved by reaching agreement over the firing of Palestinian missiles into southern Israel and Israel's targeted assassinations of Palestinian terrorists. The parties could agree that Gilad Shalit be released and that if within say three months no missiles are fired into Israel (or no other terrorist attacks are carried out) then Israel would release a certain agreed number of detainees. This could then set in motion further releases in "installments" over the coming years until a majority of the 9,000 detainees are released (apart from those with blood on their hands). The releases would only take place if no terrorist attacks took place in given time periods. Israel for its part could undertake to desist from targeted assassinations so long as no terrorist acts were committed by the Palestinians. Should the plan work then both sides could justly claim credit: for Israel the release of Shailt and a halt to terrorist attacks and for the Hamas the release of detainees and a cessation in targeted assassinations.
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